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Organization Studies of Inequality, with and beyond Piketty 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century did much to bring discussions of economic 
inequality into the intellectual and popular mainstream. This paper indicates how business, 
management and organization studies can productively engage with Cap21st. It does this by 
deriving practical consequences from Piketty’s proposed division of intellectual labour in 
general and his account of ‘supermanagers’ in particular. There are organizational 
specificities to inequality which Piketty’s framework does not address, however. Cap21st’s 
account of corporate governance, of tax avoidance policy and of financialisation, in 
particular, requires significant conceptual and empirical supplementation. We argue that 
business, management and organisational scholars should contribute to the cross-disciplinary 
inequality research project which Cap21st proposes not despite these limitations but because 
of them.  
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Introduction 
 
Social scientific research is and always will be tentative and imperfect. It can help to redefine 
the terms of debate, unmask certain preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all 
positions to constant critical scrutiny. In my view, this is the role that intellectuals, including 
social scientists, should play, as citizens like any other but with the good fortune to have more 
time than others to devote themselves to study (and even to be paid for it — a signal 
privilege) (Piketty, 2014a: 3). 
 
Capital in the 21st Century (henceforth Cap21st) is a product of an analytic tradition which 
studies the facts of economic inequality (e.g. Milanovic, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013; Atkinson, 
2015) in order to propose how they might be managed (e.g. Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; 
Dorling and Rees, 2003). It has had tremendous influence upon the social sciences and 
contemporary policy debates alike (see Piketty, 2016; Kunkel, 2014). According to Piketty 
himself (2015) the book has catalysed, not caused, a wide-spread return to fundamental 
questions of the causes and consequences of economic inequality. This paper demonstrates 
that catalyst’s importance to our discipline.  
 
Proceeding through over 600 pages of Cap 21st’s data, table and graph laden prose, it quickly 
becomes apparent that this is no manifesto. And yet, it has been filtered through numerous 
intellectual, practical and ideological agendas, not all of which, as the infamous debate 
concerning the tension between the book’s empirical claims and their methodological support 
illustrates (Piketty, 2014b), have received it effusively (see also McCloskey, 2014). It 
remains for an authoritative account of the wider context underpinning the book’s voracious 
consumption. The following four factors, at least, would figure within any such account: 
 
1. It provides the basis for a set of demands to those whom Western parliamentary 
democratic systems no longer seem to represent (Crouch, 2004, Standing, 2014).  
 
2. It provides an economic alternative to the counter-intuitive return to neo-liberal 
economic policies in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (Brown, 2015; 
Mazzucato, 2011; Crouch, 2011, Davies, 2014; Mirowski, 2013).  
 
3. It provides empirical legitimacy to the contestation of the supposed hegemony of 
austerity politics (Piketty at al 2015; Palley, 2015).  
 
4. It provides a means of intensifying the widely documented calls made by multiple 
global occupations on behalf of “The 99%” (Graeber, 2013; 2011), against “the 1%” 
(Wedel, 2015; Dorling, 2015).  
 
Beyond providing its readers with empirical data which they can cite and a conceptual 
framework which they can use, Cap21st also issues an invitation to would be collaborators. 
While this invitation has been well received across many contemporary social sciences, 
scholars of business, management and organisation haven’t yet been so receptive. This paper 
both explains and addresses that imbalance.  
 
The paper also underlines why Piketty’s framework should not be uncritically adopted. 
Labour Process Theory and Critical Management Studies, in particular, have examined the 
organization as a source of inequality in ways we’d do well not to abandon. Disciplinary 
pretensions aside, there are three features of Cap21st itself which prohibit its wholesale 
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adoption. What Piketty has to say about corporate governance, what he has to say about the 
prospects for redistributive taxation organizations, and what he does not have to say about 
financialisation prove unfortunately instructive in this regard. Taken together, these are not 
fundamental constraints but difficult hurdles which should be overcome so that we might 
study inequality both with and beyond Piketty.  
 
Organization Studies and Inequality  
 
Inequality is inextricably linked to the world of work and organizations (Acker, 2006; 
Armstrong, 2011; Bapuji, 2015; Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Mcguire, 2002). And yet, 
as has been repeatedly claimed (e.g. Riaz, 2015; Barley, 2007; Hinings and Greenwood, 
2002), organization scholars have underplayed the role of organizations in the maintenance, 
continuation and/or alleviation of economic inequality. How has this neglect been accounted 
for?  
 
For some, it is the apparently contradictory demands for social scientific detachment, on the 
one hand, and for interventionist commitment, on the other, which explains the systematic 
neglect of controversial issues such as inequality (Wray-Bliss, 2003; Weik and Parker, 2013; 
Fournier and Smith, 2012; Greenwood and Bernardi, 2014; Grey, 2010; George, 2014). The 
very engagement with inequality, it seems, raises questions over the robustness and reliability 
of emotionally and politically committed studies. Speaking out, moreover, frequently results 
in adverse consequences for the speaker (Jack, 2004; Parker, 2014). Many organizational 
scholars may therefore have elected to analyse less morally and politically loaded phenomena 
than inequality, so that they can be treated safely and taken seriously (Burrell, 1997; 
Banerjee, 2008; Fournier and Smith, 2012; Tatli, 2012; Butler and Spoelstra, 2012; Grey, 
2010; Parker, 2002). The adverse effects of disciplinary narcissism are by no means unique to 
our field, though these have repeatedly featured within explanations of why inequality has 
adopted a largely peripheral status within the discipline.   
 
Explanations of the paucity of studies of inequality regularly highlight the consequences of 
the long going debate between Labour Process Theory (LPT) and Critical Management 
Studies (CMS). According to Armstrong (2015), the field’s shift from inequality was more or 
less endorsed by Alvesson and Wilmott’s (1992) prioritisation of subjectivity and micro-
emancipation above inequality and antagonism (see also Armstrong, 2011; Hanlon, 2015). 
For other prominent exponents of LPT, CMS’s demonstrable fragmentation betrays its 
practitioner’s intellectual and political ineptitude (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995). Such 
complaints are frequently confronted with the achievements and drawbacks of an evolving 
institutional predicament (Parker, 2014; Bridgman and Stephens, 2008). We will forego a 
rehearsal of the long-going and frequently ill-tempered divisions between LPT and CMS here 
(although see Hassard et al 2001 and Bohm and Land, 2012): rightly or wrongly, practitioners 
of CMS have been held responsible, by practitioners of LPT, for their shared discipline’s 
underwhelming engagement with inequality. 
 
A third series of explanations of inequality’s underrepresentation emphasises the existence of 
an implicit scholarly division of labour. On this account, inequality is held as a matter of 
crucial importance for organizational life which, nevertheless, is better left to the expertise 
residing in other disciplines (Augier et al., 2005; Davis and Cobb, 2010; Dunne et al., 2008; 
Riaz, 2015). This explanation, just like the disingenuous pretence to disciplinary objectivity 
and the disgruntlement against CMS explanations already mentioned, has not been without its 
detractors. Claims are regularly made against scholarly specialisation and for 
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interdisciplinary work (e.g. Grey and Willmott, 2002; Tsoukas, 2016). And simultaneously, 
against it on grounds of superficial borrowing (Zahra and Newey, 2009), resulting in the loss 
of credibility (Clegg, 2006) and ceremonial performances (Lilley and Parker, 2016).   
 
Each of these explanations has something important to suggest about why we do not engage 
with inequality. Rather than treat this as a deliberate shortcoming or calculated disinterest, 
however, it makes sense to view any seeming neglect as a sociological product of disciplinary 
evolution. For even more than sociology, organization studies has predominately been written 
– perhaps even still - in the shadow of economics (e.g. Varoufakis, 2008). The ascent above 
that shadow required organizational scholars to both assert and demonstrate the existence of 
extra-economic phenomena so that these could be subsequently investigated and debated. So 
it should come as little surprise, then, that a discipline which initially defined itself in 
opposition to economics should be silent on what is so regularly construed as an ostensible 
economic phenomenon as inequality. 
 
Early pioneers suggest the organization is neither reducible to the utility maximising 
individual of neoclassical economics nor to the circuitous system of macro-economics 
(Simon, 1965). The organization, likewise, is not reducible to the firm of institutional 
economics (Gindis, 2009; see also Dunne et al 2016). We would do well to remind ourselves, 
then, that organizational scholarship exists today largely because it was convincingly 
demonstrated, to a sufficient enough number of people, that economics cannot come to terms 
with the specificity of the organizational form. The price paid for the achievement of 
disciplinary autonomy, if radical critics of the discipline are to be believed, has been a 
sustained investigation into the organizational underpinnings of inequality.  
 
Today, however, in an ironic twist, organization studies stands to prosper not by freeing itself 
from economics but by reformulating its relationship with economics. So Cap21st’s implicit 
cross-disciplinary invitation should not, we think, be suspected in the way of a Trojan horse. 
As we will see, just like many organizational scholars, Piketty places economic reductionism 
amongst his enemies. And just like many organizational scholars, Piketty also refuses the 
epistemological pretence towards hard objectivity. He is a blissfully aware product of the 
French tradition of the ‘public intellectual’, announcing it as his role to intervene in wider 
social issues; he appears engaged in a form of ‘public sociology’ which we associate with 
Burawoy today and with C Wright Mills before him (on which see Brook and Darlington, 
2013; Dallyn et al., 2015). Organizational scholars could do a lot worse than take Piketty’s 
lead on the matter of inequality. 
 
Piketty’s Invitation to Social-Scientific Collaboration 
 
Cap21st’s introductory prelude bemoans, respectively, the neglectful de-prioritisation of 
empirical studies of inequality on the part of the contemporary social sciences:  
 
the social sciences have largely lost interest in the distribution of wealth and questions of 
social class since the 1970s. Before that, statistics about income, wages, prices, and wealth 
played an important part in historical and sociological research. (Piketty, 2014a: 32) 
 
As well as the dismissal of the social sciences on the part of economics:   
 
To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its childish passion for 
mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation, at the 
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expense of historical research and collaboration with the other social sciences. (Piketty, 
2014a: 32) 
 
Both statements of regret are instructive for our present concerns. Of the first we can say that, 
despite Piketty’s lamentation of data driven theory building’s decline, his book is neither anti-
theoretical nor non-theoretical (Piketty, 2014a: 30-33). Part One, most obviously, introduces 
a series of “basic notions” (ibid: 42) and “basic concepts” (ibid: 113) which buttress the 
empirical analysis carried out in the later sections. Central among these foundations is the 
book’s “first fundamental law of capitalism,i” the secondii of which is held back until Part 
Two. These two laws, taken together, provide Piketty with a means through which Cap21st’s 
voluminous empirical data can be arranged and analysediii. So it is not until the 24th page that 
we are treated to the first of the book’s ninety-seven “illustrations”. And readers of Cap21st 
are required to wait until the 63rd page before capturing so much as a glimpse of its eighteen 
“tables” (ibid: 665-669). The book’s empiricism, in other words, is built upon firm theoretical 
foundations.  
 
Those who turn to Cap21st anticipating additional theoretical edification, however, have 
regularly ended up disappointed (e.g. Savage, 2014; Roscoe, 2014). Theory’s role there, 
while indispensable, is by no means prolonged. This is because Cap21st underplays its 
evaluative disposition on the proportionate ‘long-term’ distribution of wealth between capital 
and labour (on which see Cowell, 2014) through a series of earnest appeals to the empirical 
facts as provided by the World Top Incomes Database (WTID).iv As Piketty puts it:  
 
If this study is to make even modest progress on these questions and at least clarify the terms 
of a debate that appears to be endless, it will be useful to begin by establishing some facts as 
accurately and carefully as possible. (ibid: 41) 
 
An informative if predictable series of commentaries have underlined similarities and 
differences between Marx’s Capital and Cap21st (e.g. Read, 2015; Harvey, 2014; Wright, 
2015) but Piketty’s claim to have advanced on Marx’s analysis has less of the agitating 
militant and more of the policy oriented social scientist about it (see Dolceroca and 
Terzioglu, 2014; Jones, 2014). If Piketty is interested in the theological subtleties and 
metaphysical niceties of today’s financialized commodity form, his interest presides outside 
of Cap21st (see Toscano and Woodcock, 2015 and Derrida, 1994). Alongside Marx, the 
spectres of Ricardo, Smith, and Kuznets are also evoked and exorcised throughout Cap21st, 
not because Piketty has developed a new theory of capital but because he has accessed and 
analysed new empirical evidence concerning capital’s evolution: 
 
I had two advantages over previous authors. First, this work benefits, naturally enough, from 
a longer historical perspective than its predecessors had… Second, advances in computer 
technology have made it much easier to collect and process large amounts of historical data. 
(ibid: 19-20)  
 
Despite such vocational humility in the presence of the newly available evidence, however, 
Piketty is more than alive to the pitfalls of data fetishism. So while he clearly favours the 
explanatory power of evidence above that of theory, he nevertheless acknowledges that social 
scientists unavoidably adopt an interpretive – if not evaluative - position towards their 
objects. Even the robust artefacts of “national accounts”, Piketty willingly acknowledges, 
need to be appreciated by social scientists as:  
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a social construct in perpetual evolution. They always reflect the preoccupations of the era 
when they were conceived. We should be careful not to make a fetish of the published figures 
(ibid: 58). 
 
So the perils of data fetishism, according to Piketty, cannot be ultimately eliminated though it 
can be tempered through a pragmatic interpretive disposition. Reflexivity is Piketty’s hygiene 
test for reification and, for all of his dutiful capitulation to the data, he harbours no pretences 
towards any strong notion of objectivity:  
 
Provided we use these data with caution and in a critical spirit and complement them with 
other data where there are errors or gaps (say, in dealing with tax havens), these national 
accounts are an indispensable tool for estimating aggregate income and wealth. (ibid: 58-9) 
 
Piketty writes these words as an economist deeply suspicious of his own discipline’s 
superiority complexes. Against ‘economics imperialism’ (cf. Fox, 2013) Piketty urges cross-
disciplinarity. All social scientists, he believes, have an important role to play in the ongoing 
investigation of inequality. Just so many collaborative research projects undertaken along 
cross-disciplinary lines and in accordance with an expertise-derived division of intellectual 
labour, however, will not eventually produce a pure account of inequality which is 
uncontaminated by interpretation and/or evaluation. Cross-disciplinary collaboration, for 
Piketty, nevertheless provides a better chance of improving our understanding of inequality 
than the wilfully myopic alternative of disciplinary prioritisation or inter-disciplinary turf-
wars. In a recent keynote speech to sociologists which discussed Cap21st at length, Michael 
Burawoy welcomed this challenge. Inequality, he affirmed, “is not just something external to 
us, but also invades our own world” (2015: 5). In so doing, Burawoy broadened the 
experience of inequality beyond a narrow sociological or economic specialism. 
 
Piketty’s Division of Social-Scientific Labour 
 
Throughout much of the previous century, in Britain, the income gap between the richest and 
the poorest steadily narrowed. In 1918, 19% of all annual income fell to the top 1%. This 
figure fell to 14% in 1935, to 12% in 1960, to 7% in 1970 and to 6% in 1980 (Dorling, 2010: 
400). For Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets (1953), the shortening income gap 
was a natural consequence of economically advanced democratic societies (see also Piketty, 
2014a: 1-14). During the last 30 years, however, the long-term trend of reduced national and 
global rates of income inequality has been reversed. By 1992, the top 1% accounted for 10% 
of national income. In 2001 this rate stood at 13% and by 2005 it was almost back up to its 
1918 level, at 16% (Dorling, 2010: 400, see also Hills, 2010, Dorling, 2015 and Hulme and 
Toye, 2013). The detailed empirical analyses of Cap21st observe the same general trend 
analysed by Danny Dorling and other contemporary scholars of inequality, both within and 
beyond Britain. The gap between the rich and the poor has steadily decreased from the end of 
the first quarter of the 20th century onwards. That convergent trend was reversed from the 
beginning of the final quarter of the 20th century onwards, however, with the gap between the 
rich and the poor increasing since then.  
 
Piketty regularly raises the possibility that these rates of inequality could return to their early 
20th century levels, or even higher. This, he believes, should give social scientists and 
democratic citizens ample cause for concern. And so it is the role of contemporary social 
scientists working together, Piketty believes, to understand these developments as rigorously 
as possible, so that they might be harnessed. An impassioned vocational commitment to the 
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minimisation of inequality alone on the part of social scientists will not be sufficient. For 
without robust evidence, policy suggestions can be very easily discredited. The principal 
responsibility of the contemporary social scientist set on addressing growing levels of 
inequality, then, is to provide both the facts and an explanation of the factors which underpin 
them.  
 
So what are these factors underpinning the fact of inequality’s gradual re-emergence? 
According to Piketty, discounting the important roles played by militarily induced economic 
activity and the occasionally convergent effects of technological innovation, there are two 
principal factors which have defined 20th century economic inequality’s recent return to 
divergence. We will turn to the second of these – the evolution ‘from a society of rentiers to a 
society of managers’ (2014a: 276) in the next section. The first of these factors is the 
structural constraint upon class mobility which derives from the capacity of the well born to 
inherit property. “Make no mistake”, Piketty puts it, “the growth of a true ‘patrimonial (or 
propertied) middle class’ was the principal structural transformation of the distribution of 
wealth in the developed countries in the twentieth century” (ibid.: p. 260).  
 
The predicament of today’s rent-paying Parisian who will probably never set foot upon the 
first rung of the elusive property ladder, Piketty suggests, is the flip side to that of Honoré 
Balzac’s 18th century Goirot’s children, the high-standing of whom was precipitated by their 
father’s appreciation of the intergenerational advantages accruing to property owners. 
Likewise, the contemporary Londoner knows only too well the structurally disadvantageous 
consequences of their family’s not having been party to the complexities of managing an 
internationally diverse property portfolio, just as many of Jane Austen’s characters 
experienced precisely the opposite. And so Piketty asks: 
 
What actual changes have occurred in the structure of capital since the eighteenth century? 
Père Goriot’s pasta may have become Steve Jobs’s tablet, and investments in the West Indies 
in 1800 may have become investments in China or South Africa in 2010, but has the deep 
structure of capital really changed? (ibid.: 115) 
 
Later on, returning to Père Goirot and in what he goes on to call ‘the darkest moment of the 
novel’ (ibid.: 239), we find Piketty’s analysis of ‘Vautrin’s Lesson’ (ibid.: 238-240). 
Although set in the 1800s, the novel’s ‘cynical’ Vautrin explains to its ‘worthy’ Rastignac 
something which, after the convergent trends of mid-20th century capitalism has dissipated, 
might well strike contemporary landless citizens who hold little hope of inheriting property as 
eminently prudent if slightly contemptible: 
 
In substance, Vautrin explains to Rastignac that it is illusory to think that social success can 
be achieved through study, talent and effort…the strategy for social success that Vautrin 
proposes to Rastignac is a bit more efficient. By marrying…he will immediately lay hands on 
a fortune (ibid.: 239-240).          
  
There are important differences between the rent-seeking capitalism of the 18th and 19th 
century and the industrialised – and later financialised – that have come to replace it: the no 
longer relatively stable rates of return accruing to capital ownership not least of all. What 
makes Vautrin’s lesson one which might be listened to if not necessarily heeded today, 
Piketty suggests, is that in a situation in which economic growth seems to have become 
stagnant, and after monetary bearings have become lost, the advantages accruing to those 
who already own capital becomes intensified (ibid.:72-109; 232-233). We are, Piketty 
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suggests, witnessing a return to aspects of the class dynamics which characterised the 18th 
and 19th centuries whereby your family’s property which you stand to inherit, determines 
your life chances to a much greater extent than your ability – understood either as a seller of 
labour or as an agent of entrepreneurship – ever could. So Cap21st dispels the myth of 
contemporary capitalism’s meritocratic nature (see also Castilla, and Bernard, 2010; Littler, 
2013; O’ Brien et al, 2016), by highlighting how inherited wealth is one of contemporary 
inequality’s crucial underpinnings.  
   
Whereas it falls to the economist to measure the distribution of wealth over time, it falls to 
non-economists, Piketty asserts, to investigate how given levels of economic inequality 
become rendered justifiable, or not. The economist should thus seek to establish the evolving 
levels of inequality while non-economists, working on their own apportioned part of the 
inequality puzzle, should elucidate the ongoing dynamics of contestation and/or the gradual 
processes which explain the normalisation of these levels:  
 
economics should never have sought to divorce itself from the other social sciences and can 
advance only in conjunction with them. The social sciences collectively know too little to 
waste time on foolish disciplinary squabbles. If we are to progress in our understanding of the 
historical dynamics of the wealth distribution and the structure of social classes, we must 
obviously take a pragmatic approach and avail ourselves of the methods of historians, 
sociologists, and political scientists as well as economists. (2014a: 32-33) 
 
A cross-disciplinary roll-call then: sociology, psychology, cultural history, political history 
and the more general study of beliefs and perceptions (Brown and Spencer, 2014; Skeggs, 
2015).  What appears missing, however, is recognition of the contribution made by our 
discipline to a socially scientific collaborative understanding of inequality throughout 
Cap21st, even in passing.  
 
We could react to such omission by prematurely opposing Piketty's invite, interpreting it as a 
patronising sleight or an ignorance which requires disciplinarily partisan counter-active 
remedy. Or, as we instead recommend, we could elect to work with Cap21st, asking in the 
first instance not how our work on inequality can negate Piketty’s but what Piketty’s account 
of super-managers can bring to our ongoing investigations.  
 
Organization Studies of Inequality, with Piketty  
 
Super-managers, Piketty has demonstrated, have become indispensable agents of 
contemporary inequality’s exacerbation: there cannot be many areas within our field which 
can proceed unaffected by this factual claim. And so, we speak of Piketty’s implicit invitation 
to organizational scholars to join his cross-disciplinary collaborative project. For Piketty’s 
concern with super-managerialism - the ability of senior corporate executives to negotiate 
their own remuneration packages - and the manner of its justification, both can and should be 
interpreted as a collaboration invitation to scholars of business, management and organization 
scholars.  
 
Having demonstrated that the extant levels of executive compensation within Britain and the 
United States have, since the 1980s, come to dwarf non-Anglo-American managerial 
remuneration levels, Piketty highlights the question of the legitimacy of levels of inequality 
as one which non-economists need to be asking. Immediately after doing so he goes on to 
make the following telling concession: 
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This approach to executive compensation in terms of social norms and acceptability seems 
rather plausible a priori, but in fact it only shifts the difficulty to another level. The problem is 
now to explain where these social norms come from and how they evolve… The problem of 
inequality is a problem for the social sciences in general, not for just one of its disciplines 
(2014a: 333).   
 
The rise of the economic inequality exacerbating super-manager which Piketty’s evidence 
reveals still requires explanation, by his own admission, at the level of its normativity as well 
as at the level of its organizational manifestation. The question organizational scholars need 
to be asking, following Piketty, is not whether super-managers are overpaid: this question is 
much too loaded for it to be addressed social-scientifically. The question we rather need to be 
asking is how, given the vast and growing gap between supermanager remuneration levels 
relative to those of the vast majority of contemporary employees, such disparities have been 
opposed, tolerated, justified or celebrated: 
 
The explosion of supermanager salaries should of course be seen in relation to firm size and 
to the growing diversity of functions within the firm. But the objectively complex problem of 
governance of large organizations is not the only issue. It is also possible that the explosion of 
top incomes can be explained as a form of “meritocratic extremism,” by which I mean the 
apparent need of modern societies, and especially US society, to designate certain individuals 
as “winners” and to reward them all the more generously if they seem to have been selected 
on the basis of their intrinsic merits rather than birth or background (2014a: 334).    
 
Whereas the responsibility for providing an account of the factors underpinning or hindering 
the development of ‘meritocratic extremism’ falls to the sociologist (e.g. McCall, 2014; 
Ridgeway, 2014), the complexities of corporate governance implicitly fall within the remit of 
the organizational scholar. Piketty repeatedly insists that the majority of contemporary 
executive remuneration packages no longer relate to discernible levels of firm performance. 
So in order to track contemporary inequality’s evolution, it will not be enough for economists 
to analyse the contents of the WTID, or for sociologists to explain why this or that economic 
ideal manifests. We – that is to say organizational scholars – will also need to demonstrate 
the active role which changes in the corporate form itself have had upon measurable levels of 
economic inequality. This is not to suggest that the contemporary corporate form exists for 
the sake of concealing massive wage disparities between the few and the many, it is rather to 
insist that the seemingly arid terrain of corporate governance is a fertile ground upon which 
organizational scholars might productively contribute to Piketty’s cross-disciplinary 
programme.  
 
There is also important work for organizational scholars to do, with Piketty, on the question 
of taxation. The legal form through which a given organization is incorporated has tax 
implications.  Since taxation is a mechanism of wealth (re-)distribution, scholars 
investigating inequality should take an interest in an organizations legal incorporation 
(Veldman 2013; Veldman and Willmott 2013). Organizations, just like individuals, are 
entitled to minimise their tax burden within the limits of the law. The relationship between 
individuals, organizations and tax-law is not always absolutely asymmetric, however. Think-
tanks, in particular, exist for the sake of lobbying governments, often on behalf of 
corporations, though sometimes also on behalf of individuals, on a variety of political-
economic issues, taxation notably among them (Savage, 2016; Cave and Rowell, 2014; 
Carter and McKinlay, 2013). The following statement, from Piketty, provides a further list of 
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issues which organizational scholars who seek to work alongside him might productively 
elaborate upon: 
 
the decrease in the top marginal income tax rate led to an explosion of very high incomes, 
which then increased the political influence of the beneficiaries of the change in the tax laws, 
who had an interest in keeping top tax rates low or even decreasing them further and who 
could use their windfall to finance political parties, pressure groups, and think tanks. (2014a: 
335) 
 
So far, we have argued that Piketty’s work matters to scholars of inequality. Piketty’s 
research philosophy, we continued, encourages cross-disciplinary collaboration which is 
predicated upon a sense of an expertise-driven intellectual division of labour. While Piketty 
doesn’t allot specific inequality researching tasks to the organizational scholar, we derived 
two areas which we are implicitly invited to investigate further with him: corporate 
governance as it pertains to ‘supermanagers’ and processes of corporate tax lobbying through 
the figure of the think-tank. It remains for us to highlight some of the shortcomings of 
Piketty’s implicit collaboration invitation, in its present formulation.   
 
Organization Studies of Inequality, beyond Piketty 
 
Despite the positive case we have made for it so far, Piketty’s analysis of the evolution of the 
relative rates of executive remuneration nevertheless begs an important question: how have 
organizational structures and cultures transformed during the corresponding period? This is a 
significant but by no means irreversible oversight on Piketty’s part since the basis of an 
answer can be developed in collaboration with contemporary business, management and 
organization studies. Studies of corporate governance, of corporate taxation and of 
financialisation provide a firm basis upon which organizational scholars might distinctively 
contribute to Piketty’s cross-disciplinary collaborative project.  
 
The Organizational Specificity of Governance 
 
Piketty demonstrates that the remuneration packages and compensation schemes of CEOs 
and related directorship-positions have changed since the 1980s through the incorporation of 
equity-based compensation alongside, and in some cases at the expense of, traditional waged 
labour. This, he continues, has led to increased income inequality whereby CEOs and 
executive directors take advantage of the tax breaks consequential to the revised 
remuneration packages which they have been capable of negotiating for themselves. Such 
practices, Piketty argues, has led to the gradual concentration of wealth amongst 
supermanagers at the vastly disproportionate expense of non-managerial labourers and non-
executive managers alike. Piketty’s proposal to tax wealth - and not merely income - is 
conceived as a means of reversing this trend. He therefore encourages a tax-focus on all areas 
of the super-manager’s income, not merely the waged component.  
 
Contemporary corporate governance scholarship suggests, however, that any systematic 
change to existing compensation structures is unlikely to succeed. Ongoing debates highlight 
the role played by institutionalised regulator embeddedness and shareholder conservatism. 
Commenting on why the EU rejected popular proposals to cap executive bonuses, for 
example, The EU Advocate General argued:  
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Fixing the ratio of variable remuneration to basic salaries does not equate to a 'cap on bankers 
bonuses', or fixing the level of pay, because there is no limit imposed on the basic salaries that 
the bonuses are pegged against (c.f. Miller, 2014). 
 
Krugman (2007) also outlines the general disinclination to pursue changes to existing 
compensation packages, claiming instead that the market has effectively accepted 
compensation schemes as the most efficient means of punishing under-performing CEOs. 
Many studies indicate that this hypothetical rationale bears out empirically (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Edmans et al., 2009). The influence of agency theory’s classical claim that 
CEOs need to be appropriately incentivized in order to perform in accordance with the 
interests of shareholders vis-a-vis shareholder wealth maximization shows few signs of 
withering away, despite compelling counter-arguments (e.g. Ghoshal, 2005; Barkema and 
Pennings, 1998).  
 
With executive managerial decision-making increasingly focused on the market valuations of 
companies based on share price, investor returns and creating market confidence, labour 
costs, are reduced by whatever means necessary (Cushen and Thompson, 2016). Contextual 
evidence for this claim can be seen in the increasing use of performance management in 
corporate restructuring (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000), in the closure of final salary 
pensions schemes (Langley, 2004), in the development of strong hierarchical and financial 
controls, and, more generally, in the imperative of ‘doing more with less’. These various 
agency theory sanctioned activities are also said to have created a new form of “disconnected 
capitalism” (Thompson, 2003), where specific deals done by particular managers and Human 
Resource departments need not be honoured in the longer term. Clark (2009:777) also 
suggests that the onset of this ‘private-equity business model’ (PEBM), further diffuses the 
inability of employers to invest in employees, given that ‘investor-owner interests are of 
growing prominence to the relative exclusion of other stakeholders’. Contemporary executive 
management today therefore presupposes the simultaneous squeezing of labour and 
monetization of assets (Thompson and Harley, 2012: 1374) where labour is usually ‘the first 
casualty’ of corporate restructuring (Froud et al., 2000: 771). To suggest executive 
remuneration packages are at the root of economic inequality, in the way of Piketty, is only to 
beg a series of political questions meted out at the organizational level.  
 
The legal form of the contemporary corporation also poses a significant challenge to any 
reform which sets its sights on the reduction of inequality via the redistribution of allegedly 
unfairly gotten wealth. While for Piketty, corporate wealth disproportionately falls to those 
who control the organization – the supermanagers – recent research has made a political-
economic issue of how the incorporation of the corporate legal person provides for the legally 
sanctioned minimisation of the executive’s tax liability (Veldman and Willmott, 2013; 
Veldman, 2013; Corporate Reform Collective; 2014). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have also 
considered the corporate legal form to be a significant reformist stumbling block. The relative 
power of directors and compensation committee executives to determine corporate decisions, 
they argue, can disenfranchise shareholders (see also Conyon, 2006). While shareholders can 
of course veto compensation arrangements if, ex-post, such arrangements were seen as 
wasteful or ‘so irrational that no reasonable person could approve it’ (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004: 46), the evidence for the success of these and related instances of ‘shareholder 
activism’, is mixed at best (Krugman, 2007; Ferri and Maber, 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011; 
Goranova and Ryan, 2014).  
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Successful or not, shareholder activism is in no way reducible to Piketty's argument for direct 
political intervention into the organization’s already complicated affairs. It nevertheless 
suggests an unlikely confluence between Piketty’s social-democratic politics, on the one 
hand, and the disenfranchised shareholder class, on the other, united as they both are in their 
vilification of the supermanager. The complexity of shareholder-CEO relations are therefore 
a matter on which organizational scholars and Piketty might work together if inequality is to 
become sufficiently appreciated across its many disciplinary dimensions.  
 
The Organizational Specificity of Tax 
 
In the lead up to the publication of Cap21st, Piketty and Saez (2007; 2012; 2013) modelled a 
series of progressive tax scenarios with respect to their hypothetical economically 
redistributive consequences. On inheritance tax, they found (2012; 2013) that a lifetime 
capital tax model alongside wealth taxation could act as a progressive solution of a socially 
optimal taxation system. With specific reference to the US federal tax system for individuals, 
they also found (2007) that the progressiveness of the taxation system has declined since the 
1960s, especially with respect to top earners. Resonating with Cap21st, they claim that 
increases in the income levels of the top 0.01% of earners, especially US CEOs, is merely a 
reward for good luck, rather than talent (Piketty et al., 2014) and that higher individual tax 
rates for top earning CEOs, in the US, would dissuade “wasteful bargaining” (ibid.: 260) for 
additional remuneration. Viewing this additional income as unearned, owing more to market-
based luck than actual CEO performance, Piketty et al. (2014: 269) suggest that there may be 
a social perception that this income is therefore unfairly earned: the case for a progressive tax 
system thereby becomes stronger.  Such suggestions, coupled with the conclusions of 
Cap21st, have resonated with political commentators (Jones, 2014), economists (Milanovic, 
2014), and journalists (Wedel, 2015) united in the apparent assumption that social democratic 
economic principles might reverse the worst excesses of financialised economic inequality.  
 
One of the principal benefits which a diversified organizational structure allows for, however, 
is the exploitation of potential tax gains. Multi-national corporations routinely compete with 
one another today by adopting a series of inventive residency shifts which serve to minimise 
their tax burden (Sikka, 2010; 2012), as illustrated though the case of the Panama Papers and 
Luxleaks 2013. Contemporary sovereign states similarly compete with one another through 
their provision of corporate and organizational tax allowances (Murphy, 2011; Beverungen et 
al, 2012a). Think of the Republic of Ireland’s peculiar relationship to Apple, where in a 
seemingly bizarre move, the national government protested a European Commission ruling 
that Apple should pay uncollected tax benefits of up to €13 billion (Department of Finance, 
2016). It is because global tax rates differ across geographical and legal jurisdictions that 
organizational tax havens (Slemrod and Wilson, 2009; Bucovetsky, 2014) and/or complex tax 
loopholes have become almost as controversial as they are lucrative. Individual sovereign 
states, for their part, would also be adversely affected by the implementation of a globally 
standardized tax policy. These losses would come not only through the potential loss of 
taxable revenue previously accruing from footloose organizations but also through the growth 
in the associated administrative costs of tax collection (Slemrod and Wilson, 2009).   
 
Not only are contemporary organizations required by the agency theory sanctioned axiom of 
shareholder wealth maximisation to respond to tax policy, they also frequently engage in 
extensive lobbying activities for the sake of affecting - or delaying – the  instigation of new 
taxation infrastructures (Barley, 2010; Harvie et al., 2012). The growth in the bargaining 
power of contemporary organizations with respect to their tax burden suggests 
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oligopolistically derived privileges. According to Foster and McChesney (2012), the largest 
200 US corporations in 1950 accounted for approximately 21% of gross profits in the US 
economy. By 2008 this level had grown to 30% which, in turn, accounted for 40% of all 
world income. Such proportionate levels of wealth have translated directly into 
disproportionate levels of political power. Corporations, imbued by wealth-maximisation, 
aim to tilt tax policies in their favour, thereby exacerbating economic inequality. Executives 
too play an active role in both influencing the politics of tax and in avoiding their 
organizational tax burden (Dyreng et al., 2010).  
 
Piketty and Saez’s hypothetical scenarios remove tax competition between different nation 
states from their models. They also skirt over the fact that some of the complexities of 
corporate governance discussed in the previous section provide the foundations for the 
contemporary organization’s drive to legally minimise its tax liability. Such complexities of 
organizational tax arrangements require us to cast considerable doubt upon the reality 
congruence of Cap21st’s progressive taxation policies. Any progressive tax proposals, 
Piketty’s included, will be both vociferously contested and imaginatively embraced as a 
matter of contemporary organizational course. These shortcomings of Piketty’s work are 
significant though not insurmountable. It would again fall to organizational researchers to 
bring such insights to bear upon any cross-disciplinary collaborative project concerning 
inequality.     
 
The Organizational Specificity of Finance  
 
Access to money – to finance - has a crucial role to play in the global distribution of wealth 
and income. The rate of return on financial assets regularly differs from g, the rate of 
economic growth at the foundation of Piketty’s laws of capitalism. Consequentially, even 
sympathetic assessments of Cap21st have been drawn to criticise its account of money and, 
by association, its appreciation of the role played by financial agents in the production of 
inequality. While technological innovation, access to education, patrimonial inheritance 
allowances and supermanager privilege are indispensable to Piketty’s inequality puzzle, a 
coherent account of money appears to be a vital yet missing piece. 
 
Galbraith (2014) describes inequality as an outcome of the gradual devaluation of the 
monetary value of wages relative to the growth in the market value of financial assets. His 
work forms part of an established tradition which considers the contribution of the 
proliferation of financial instrument trading and the expansion of global capital markets - in 
which large corporations can be active investors since the 1980s (for example Arnold, 2009) 
and even since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis - to contemporary rates of economic 
inequality. Also missing from Cap21st is an empirical description of the role played by the 
deregulation of financial markets in the exacerbation of inequality. For this we need to turn, 
for example, to Mirowski (2013) who documents the gradual erosion of legal constrains upon 
financial markets and to Lazzarato (2012) who describes the corresponding growth in 
consumer indebtedness during the same period. Our point here is not that Piketty ignores 
these developments or even that he is unconcerned by them, but that his analysis does not 
grant them sufficient explanatory power, treating them, rather, as epiphenomenal. Such is the 
remit of the economist. We should seek to do otherwise.   
 
The fundamentally complicated role played by money and finance within both contemporary 
capitalism and everyday life (see also Bjerg, 2014; Dodd, 2014; Lanchester, 2014) grants the 
term ‘financialisation’ a heightened degree of currency within analyses of inequality. 
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Financialisation, in the narrow political economic sense, names an historical epoch in the 
capitalist mode of production when profits increasingly accrue through financial channels, 
rather than through production-oriented activity (Arrighi, 1994; Krippner, 2005). For 
example, non-financial organizations now derive profits from financial activities while 
disinvesting from core production and service activities (Van der Zwan, 2014). 
Financialisation, in the broader sociological sense, also names the process whereby 
individuals, households and organizations bear more of the risks which the state, the would-
be lender of last resort to the banking sector, had previously assumed. As one IMF report put 
it over a decade ago: 
 
Overall, there has been a transfer of financial risk over a number of years, away from the 
banking sector to nonbanking sectors….This dispersion of risk has made the financial system 
more resilient, not the least because the household sector is acting more as a “shock absorber 
of last resort (2005: 89).  
 
It is because individuals, households and organizations are now taking on more risk, 
according to the IMF, that heightened levels of financial literacy are now required. Note, as 
Bryan et al (2009) point out, that the problem, according to the IMF, is not one of the 
misallocation of a series of risks which need to be reallocated to sovereign states. Such 
transfers of risk from states to citizens (Hacker, 2006), and from employers to employees 
(Bryan et al, 2009) – what Randy Martin referred to as the ‘financialization of daily life’ 
(Martin 2002) – now strikes us as almost natural (Eagleton, 1991, Overbeek 1990, Grady, 
2010). Financialisation, then, labels:  
 
the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and 
financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the 
national and international levels (Epstein, 2001: 3) 
 
Financialisation has ensured that corporate and financial elites play an increasing role within 
political affairs (Grady 2013, Savage and Williams 2008, Daguerre 2014), including by 
presiding over the privatization of social welfare whereby individuals concerned with their 
futures are now effectively required to purchase insurance policies. Organization scholars 
have demonstrated recent interest in how these processes produce inequality (e.g. Riaz et al., 
2011; Froud et al, 2010; Murphy and Ackroyd, 2013; Beverungen et al 2012b). Critical 
accountants, in particular, have led the way in this regard (for example, McSweeney, 2009; 
Sikka, 2009) and, while theorists have also considered these questions (DeCock et al, 2011; 
Harney, 2011), they have tended to do so without any pretence to the general theory of 
inequality which Cap21st proposes. In order for us to be capable of describing the 
contribution of processes of financialisation to global inequality, we need more by way of 
conceptual and empirical work: Piketty’s laws of capitalism cannot ground this particular 
task.     
 
Conclusion 
If organizational scholars are to make productive insights of and meaningful interventions 
into contemporary inequality, they will require the tools, the insights and, above all, the 
cross-disciplinary alliances provoked by Cap21st. Piketty’s work, as we have also claimed, 
stands to gain much from extant organizational scholarship.     
 
Just like economists, sociologists and historians, organizational scholars too might seek, as 
Piketty puts it within this paper’s epigraph, to “inform democratic debate and focus attention 
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on the right questions” (Piketty, 2014a: 3). We have followed Piketty’s advice in detail for 
the sake of describing how contemporary scholars of business, management and organization 
might research inequality, alongside other social scientists. Towards this end, we have 
signposted tentative work in this area.  A lot more needs to be done, and we believe that 
Piketty provides a meaningful framework for this scholarship. 
  
It should nevertheless be acknowledged, alongside recent commentators (Harvey, 2014; 
Wright, 2015) that Cap21st underplays class-antagonism as an agent of history, prioritising, 
instead, the empirical description of income and wealth over time and across space. This, as 
we have noted above, has put him out of favour with many contemporary Marxists. We can 
nevertheless say, with Savage (2014), that, by drawing attention to super-managers, that is to 
say, elites (see also Maclean et al., 2010; Reed, 2012; Therborn, 1978; Mills, 1956), Cap21st 
can be read from the perspective of class antagonism. Piketty probably wouldn’t mind while 
the comrades could be assuaged. One of the most important lessons to be taken from Cap21st 
is that a collaborative investigation into inequality must override inter-disciplinary and sub-
disciplinary squabbles. Only then can we develop better understandings of the object of 
inequality so that better informed interventions can be made.    
 
Cap21st does not mention business, management and organization scholars as potential allies 
by name but it does harbour an implicit invitation of our expertise. So bandwagon hitching 
might well be alleged of what has been stated above. Cap21st, after all, has achieved levels of 
popularity (and notoriety) which most economists and social scientists dare not even have 
dreamed of. Pedants may keep their anti-populist purity all to themselves. For us, Cap21st’s 
prominence is something which organization scholars concerned with inequality should seek 
to engage with and, if possible, capitalise upon. It would be churlish, not to mention counter-
productive, for us to ignore what the text has to say, not least of all because it makes a 
collaborative invitation to non-economists like us to contribute to an epistemologically robust 
series of political interventions.   
 
We are not criticising Piketty for not understanding organizations properly: it is clear that is 
not the intended contribution of Cap21st. We are also not criticising organization scholars for 
not caring about inequality: clearly many do. Our contribution here is rather a synthetic one. 
That is: we have not simply listed what Piketty can bring to organizations studies, on the one 
hand, and what organization studies can bring to Piketty, on the other. Instead, we have 
illustrated the organizational specificities of the structural issues raised by Piketty as well as 
indicated how future organizational research on inequality might proceed.  
 
In an era that has delivered both the rise of Donald Trump as US President and the demise of 
the expert, it seems entirely anachronistic to suggest that social scientists have an important 
role to play within contemporary political debates. And yet that’s the gamble which Piketty 
still suggests we should make. We concur. While the case had been made for organizational 
scholars concerned with social issues to pin their hopes on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Walsh et al., 2003), Cap 21st underlines the promise of turning instead to the contribution of 
organizations to the problem of inequality. Organization scholars should, we claim, work 
both with and beyond Piketty, in some of the ways we have outlined here, though not, of 
course, just these.   
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i “I can now present the first fundamental law of capitalism, which links the capital stock to the flow of income 
from capital. The capital/income ratio β is related in a simple way to the share of income from capital in national 
income, denoted α. The formula is    
 
α = r × β 
 
where r is the rate of return on capital.” (ibid: 52)  
  
ii “In the long run, the capital/income ratio β is related in a simple and transparent way to the savings rate s and 
the growth rate g according to the following formula: 
 
β = s/g” (ibid: 166)  
 
iii Of these two “fundamental laws”, and the relationship between them, Piketty writes:  
 
“It is important to realize that the law α = r × β is actually a pure accounting identity, valid at all times 
in all places, by construction...By contrast, the law β = s / g is the result of a dynamic process: it 
represents a state of equilibrium toward which an economy will tend if the savings rate is s and the 
growth rate g, but that equilibrium state is never perfectly realized in practice.” (ibid: 168-169) 
 
iv “Ultimately, the World Top Incomes Database (WTID), which is based on the joint work of some thirty 
researchers around the world, is the largest historical database available concerning the evolution of income in e 
quality; it is the primary source of data for this book.” (Piketty, 2014: 17).  
